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Abstract 
 
The big bath theory of earnings management suggests that firms experiencing low earnings in a 
given year may take discretionary write downs to reduce even further the current period’s earn-
ings.  The notion is that the company and its management will not be punished proportionately 
more for the big hit it takes to its already depressed earnings.  This “clearing of the decks” makes 
it easier to generate higher profits in later years.  SFAS No. 142, with its new requirement to test 
goodwill annually for impairment, provided a unique opportunity to test this big bath theory.  Ex-
amining Fortune 100 companies, this study presents compelling evidence that the big bath theory 
is more than just a theory but is instead a practiced method of managing earnings. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
ecent corporate scandals and accounting improprieties at major companies, such as Enron, World-
Com, Waste Management, Sunbeam and many others, have shaken investor confidence in the 
financial reporting process.  This current demise in investor confidence was foreseen several years 
ago by former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman Arthur Levitt.  In a September 1998 speech, 
then chairman Levitt stated, “In the zeal to satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings path, 
wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful representation.  As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an 
erosion in the quality of earnings and therefore the quality of financial reporting (Springsteel, 1998, p. 21).” 
 R
 
In his almost prophetic speech, Mr. Levitt was referring to the practice of earnings management, which 
embodies deliberate steps taken within generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to bring about a desired 
outcome.  Earnings management can be accomplished because GAAP-based financial statements require the use of 
many estimates and judgments (e.g., estimating the useful lives of plant assets, determining whether assets have 
been impaired, or deciding upon amounts accrued for loss contingencies just to name a few).  One subset of earnings 
management involves “big bath” charges, which represent significant non-recurring losses or expenses taken in the 
current period to clear the decks for improved future earnings performance (Sikora, 1999). 
 
In June 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standard (SFAS) No. 142, Accounting for Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, and created the potential for big 
bath earnings management in relation to goodwill impairment.  In particular, SFAS No. 142, which became effective 
in 2002, eliminates the periodic amortization of goodwill but instead requires that goodwill be evaluated each year 
for impairment.  If impairment exists, an immediate charge to earnings must be recorded for the amount of the 
impairment.  Testing goodwill for impairment under SFAS No. 142 involves significant use of estimates and, thus, 
opens the door for earnings management.  For a sample of companies, the current study examines whether the 
recording of goodwill impairment in the year of adopting SFAS No. 142 appears to be related to the big bath theory 
of earnings management. 
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2.  Literature Review 
 
Dye (1986) notes that management has two primary reasons to manage or manipulate earnings.  One is an 
external demand to meet earnings forecasts and increase share price; the other represents an internal demand relating 
to optimal contracting.  In this latter case, earnings allow managers to communicate with their principals (e.g., board 
of directors) concerning the level of their performance.  Regarding the external demand to meet earnings forecasts, 
Chenheiter and Melumad (2002) note that, ceteris paribus, investors infer a higher level of permanent cash flows 
from a higher level of reported earnings.  Since increasing cash flows translate into higher share prices and earnings 
are perceived to be a surrogate of cash flows, higher earnings increase the value of the firm.  Numerous studies have 
found positive evidence of earnings management being used either to meet earnings forecasts or to promote optimal 
contracting (e.g., see Healy, 1985; Moses, 1987; Trueman and Titman, 1988; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Jordan et 
al., 1997/1998; Lu, 2000; Schrand and Wong, 2000). 
 
However, managing earnings through big bath charges follows a different, yet simple, line of reasoning be-
cause earnings are made to look worse, at least in the current period.  Henry and Schmitt (2001) note that a company 
will take a large non-recurring loss one year, typically when its profits are already depressed, so that future earnings 
are not burdened.  The result is either increased future earnings or reduced variability of future earnings.  The notion 
is that, when things are already bad (i.e., depressed earnings), making them worse by clearing out the rubbish does 
little harm to the company’s or management’s reputations.  The market punishes a firm relatively the same whether 
it misses its earnings mark by a little or by a lot. 
 
Although the big bath theory has been espoused in the accounting literature for years, little empirical test-
ing of its presence exists.  A few studies examined big bath charges on the periphery or as an aside to their main 
topic of earnings management in general.  For example, Cameron and Stephens (1991), in examining the impact of 
non-recurring items on the predictive ability or variability of earnings, found that these items are not used to smooth 
earnings but instead appear to be used more consistently with the big bath theory.  Bauman et al. (2001) examined 
earnings management in relation to the discretionary adjustments associated with the valuation allowance for 
deferred tax assets and found virtually no evidence in support of earnings management.  They did find that firms 
with negative earnings tended to book significant negative adjustments to the valuation allowances, which is 
consistent with the big bath theory.  However, they warn that the big bath theory may not be driving this result as it 
could be nothing more than companies applying the rules of SFAS No. 109 the way they were intended.  More 
specifically, a net loss in the current period is one of the signs the FASB states may indicate that sufficient future 
taxable income to realize the benefits of the deferred tax asset may not materialize.  Thus, negative earnings in the 
current period represent a legitimate reason to increase the valuation allowance.  Yoon and Miller (2002), in a study 
of Korean industrial firms, provide significant evidence that the level of operating performance affects the degree of 
earnings management.  They also found evidence supporting the big bath theory in that, when operating perform-
ance was extremely poor, firms often took income-decreasing strategies rather than income-increasing ones. 
 
Four studies examined big baths or large write downs as a primary point of investigation.  Strong and 
Meyer (1987) performed a capital market study in relation to announcements of major asset write downs.  They did 
not address write downs in relation to earnings management but instead concluded that the most important determi-
nant of a write down decision is a change in senior management, especially if the new chief executive comes from 
outside the company.  Elliott and Shaw (1988) arbitrarily defined a big bath as a write down exceeding 1 percent of 
the book value of a firm’s assets.  Their mainly descriptive results showed that companies taking these discretionary 
big baths tended to be larger than other firms in their respective industries and more highly leveraged as well; they 
also seemed to be underperformers in terms of earnings. 
 
For a sample of Australian firms, Walsh et al. (1991) examined large losses and large gains reported as ex-
traordinary items.  Their results showed a strong correlation between the discretionary loss or gain reported as an 
extraordinary item and the level of current year earnings.  Companies with unusually low current year earnings in 
relation to prior years were more prone to take large discretionary losses as extraordinary items, while firms with 
unusually high current year earnings tended to recognize large discretionary gains as extraordinary items.  Chen-
heiter and Melumad (2002) provide additional evidence concerning earnings management and big baths.  In their 
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model of financial reporting where investors infer the precision of earnings, they show that a firm with sufficiently 
“bad” news (i.e., low earnings) will under report earnings by the maximum amount possible.  This is accomplished 
by taking a big bath in the current period to report higher earnings in the future.  If the news (earnings) is not 
sufficiently bad (low) in the current period, the company does not take a big bath but rather takes action to smooth 
earnings. 
 
The results from Walsh et al. (1991) and Chenheiter and Melumad (2002) provide perhaps the most com-
pelling evidence to date that the big bath theory may be more than just a theory.  Their findings suggest that further 
testing in this area is warranted, and SFAS No. 142 provides a unique opportunity for doing so. 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
SFAS No. 142 presents managers a new means of managing earnings via big bath write downs.  Under this 
new standard, goodwill is no longer amortized but must be evaluated at least annually for impairment.  The impair-
ment test is a two-step process with the first step representing a comparison between the carrying value and fair 
value of a reporting unit.  If the fair value of the reporting unit has fallen below its carrying value, a second step is 
required whereby the carrying value of the unit’s goodwill is compared to the fair value of the goodwill to determine 
the amount of the impairment.  As Massoud and Raiborn (2003) note, the impairment test under SFAS No. 142 
leaves significant room for management interpretation, judgment, and bias.  For example, discretion is required in 
allocating assets among reporting units and certainly is needed in determining fair values for the assets in the 
reporting units.  This discretion opens the door for earnings management and big bath charges. 
 
SFAS No. 142 offered another enticing reason to take big baths in the initial year of adoption (i.e., 2002).  
Impairment losses recognized in 2002 were treated primarily as cumulative effects from changing an accounting 
principle.  As such, they did not affect operating income.  After 2002, all impairment losses from deteriorating 
goodwill values must be reported in operating income. 
 
To determine whether goodwill impairment losses recognized under SFAS No. 142 appear to be the result 
of big bath earnings management, data were collected for the Fortune 100 companies for 2002 and 2001.  2002 was 
chosen as the year for investigation because, as just noted, firms had an extra incentive to report impairment losses 
in this initial year of adoption.  Data were also collected for 2001 to allow a comparison of the financial results of 
the firms between the year of adoption and a prior period.  Although not a random sample, the Fortune 100 compa-
nies were selected for two reasons.  First, they represent the largest companies in the nation and, as such, would be 
more likely to have goodwill on their books than would a randomly selected sample of publicly traded companies.  
Second, the Fortune 100 companies represent a broad cross section of industries; thus, the results of the study would 
be somewhat generalizable.  Data were collected on the sample of companies from their 10-k financial reports 
available on the SEC’s EDGAR database. 
 
A simple method was used to test for the presence of big bath earnings management in the year of adop-
tion.  Prior research (i.e., Walsh et al., 1991; Chenheiter and Melumad, 2002) showed that big bath charges are more 
likely to be taken in years with depressed earnings than in years with normal earnings.  The sample of companies 
was divided into two groups, those that recorded goodwill impairments in 2002 and those that did not.  The earnings 
levels for these two groups of companies were compared in both 2002 and 2001.  If impairment losses were taken as 
a form of big bath earnings management, then the earnings of the impairment group should have been significantly 
lower than the earnings of the non-impairment group in the year of the write down (i.e., 2002).  This is because big 
baths are supposedly taken in a year with already depressed earnings.  Additional tests were performed for 2001 
(i.e., the year prior to adoption).  More specifically, there was no a priori reason to believe that the earnings levels of 
the groups would differ in 2001 as big bath theory suggests that the write downs are recorded primarily in years with 
low earnings.  Since no write downs could occur in 2001, there should have been no difference in the earnings levels 
between the two groups in that year. 
 
Earnings levels for the two groups of firms were evaluated using two measures, return on assets (ROA) and 
return on sales (ROS).  ROA represents perhaps the most common measure of earnings for use in comparisons 
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among firms.  However, it may be inappropriate for service firms, which have lower levels of total assets than either 
manufacturing or retail firms.  Thus, ROS was also examined as it eliminates the bias that may be present in ROA 
computations.  Medians were used as summary measures for the groups rather than means because means can be 
unduly influenced by a few extreme observations, especially for small sample sizes like those examined in the 
current study.  Medians are much less affected by these extreme values. 
 
4.  Results 
 
Of the Fortune 100 companies examined, 20 firms either did not report an amount for goodwill in 2001 or 
2002 or had missing data.  Of the 80 remaining companies that reported goodwill in their financial statements, 29 
(36.3 percent) recorded a goodwill impairment loss in 2002 under SFAS No. 142 while 51 (63.7 percent) did not.  
For the 29 firms reporting an impairment loss, Table 1 provides information on the relative size or amount of the 
2002 loss.  Notice that the amount of the impairment loss appears significant.  For example, the median loss to the 
amount of 2001 goodwill (i.e., goodwill before impairment) was 20.02 percent.  The 75th percentile for this ratio is 
72.45 percent, which indicates that one fourth of the firms wrote off the vast majority of their existing goodwill. 
 
 
Table 1: Significance Of The 2002 Impairment Loss 
 
Ratio 25th percentile 50th percentile 
(median) 
75th percentile 
Impairment loss to 2001 goodwill 6.64% 20.02% 72.45% 
Impairment loss to 2002 operating income 4.54% 13.79% 95.00% 
Impairment loss to 2002 total assets 0.15% 1.01% 4.60% 
Impairment loss to 2002 sales 0.27% 1.51% 5.61% 
 
 
In a survey of most of the empirical literature on materiality at the time, Holstrum and Messier (1982) con-
cluded that an item’s effect on income was the most important factor in determining the materiality of that item.  
They concluded that a general consensus existed among most parties (i.e., auditors, preparers, and users) that items 
producing income effects greater than 10 percent are considered material.  Table 1 reveals that the median impair-
ment loss to 2002 pre-tax operating income (i.e., income before the impairment loss or other special components 
such as extraordinary items, changes in accounting principle, or discontinued operations) was 13.79 percent.   
According to Holstrum and Messier (1982), this suggests that the amount of the impairment loss for the group as a 
whole was material. 
 
Table 2 provides the median ROA, ROS, and goodwill to total assets for 2001 and 2002 for both groups of 
firms (i.e., those recording an impairment loss in 2002 and those not recording an impairment loss in 2002).  Notice 
that goodwill represented a sizable portion of total assets for both groups of firms in 2001 (i.e., before impairment) 
with median amounts of 4.81 percent and 6.48 percent for the impairment and non-impairment groups, respectively.  
The medians for the goodwill to assets ratio did not differ between these two groups in 2001 at a statistically 
significant level (i.e., α = .10).  However, in 2002, subsequent to implementation of SFAS No. 142, not surprisingly 
the median goodwill to assets ratio for the impairment group declined while the same ratio for the non-impairment 
group increased; the medians differed significantly between the two groups in 2002. 
 
The most important result in Table 2 lies in a comparison of the earnings levels for the two groups of firms.  
In 2001, prior to implementation of SFAS No. 142, the median ROAs for both groups were quite similar as were the 
median ROSs.  Statistical tests of the differences between the medians for 2001 revealed no significant difference.  
However, in the year when the impairment write downs were recorded by the 29 firms (i.e., 2002), the impairment 
group reported median ROAs and median ROSs that were significantly lower than the respective medians for the 51 
firms in the non-impairment group.  Note that these profitability measures are pre-tax and based on operating 
income before the effect of any impairment loss. 
 
 
 66
Journal Of Applied Business Research Volume 20, Number 2 
Table 2: Profitability Of The Impairment And Non-Impairment Groups Of Firms 
 
 2001 2002 
Median: Impairment Group 
Non-Impairment 
Group α level 
Impairment 
Group 
Non-Impairment 
Group α level 
Goodwill to 
total assets 4.81% 6.48% .2786 3.42% 9.11% .0047 
Return on 
assets 3.56% 2.93% .2291 2.16% 3.80% .0680 
Return on 
sales  6.40% 6.35% .5747 4.32% 7.09% .0436 
Note: α level is the significance level for a test of differences between the impairment group median and the non-impairment group median 
within the same year. 
 
 
This represents an important finding and strongly suggests the presence of big bath earnings management 
in 2002.  More specifically, big bath theory holds that firms with depressed earnings are more likely to engage in 
discretionary write downs.  The data in Table 2 reveal that the impairment group experienced significant reductions 
in earnings between 2001 and 2002 (i.e., the median ROA and ROS for this group declined precipitously between 
the years).  The non-impairment group, however, enjoyed improved earnings levels between the years.  As discussed 
in the previous paragraph, in the year of the impairment loss (i.e., 2002), the impairment group experienced earnings 
levels significantly lower than those of the non-impairment group.  Thus, all the evidence indicates that the impair-
ment group suffered from depressed earnings in 2002, and this could be a primary reason the managers decided to 
take the write downs in 2002. 
 
Henry and Schmitt (2001) note that companies with negative earnings may be more prone to take big hits 
than companies with positive earnings.  This is simply a special case of stating that firms with extremely poor 
earnings are more likely to take big baths.  However, it also provides another test for the presence of big bath 
earnings management in the two groups of firms studied.  In particular, if big bath earnings management exists, one 
would expect the impairment group to experience a higher incidence of negative earnings firms in 2002 when 
compared to the non-impairment group.  Table 3 presents the number of firms with positive earnings and negative 
earnings for both groups of firms in 2001 and 2002. 
 
 
Table 3: Negative Vs. Positive Earnings Firms For The Impairment And Non-Impairment Groups 
 
 2001 2002 
 Impairment Group Non-Impairment 
Group 
Impairment Group Non-Impairment 
Group 
Number of firms with 
negative earnings 6 (20.7%) 6 (11.8%) 9 (31.0%) 4 (7.8%) 
Number of firms with 
positive earnings 23 (79.3%) 45 (88.2% 20 (69.0%) 47 (92.2%) 
Total 29 (100%) 51 (100%) 29 (100%) 51 (100%) 
Z value 1.075 2.703 
α level .2825 .0069 
Note: Z values and α levels are for two-tailed proportions tests to determine if the proportion of negative earnings firms differed between the 
impairment group and non-impairment group.  One test was performed for 2001, and another test was performed for 2002. 
 
 
Table 3 shows that the proportion of negative earnings firms for 2001 did not differ between the impair-
ment and non-impairment groups at a statistically significant level.  However, for 2002 when the impairment write 
downs were actually recorded, the impairment group had a significantly (α = .0069) higher rate of negative earnings 
firms than did the non-impairment group.  Again, note that the earnings examined here are before any impairment 
losses.  These results provide additional evidence suggesting that big bath earnings management occurred in 2002.  
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Absent this earnings management, there would have been no expectation for one group to have a significantly higher 
negative earnings rate than the other group.  This was indeed the case in 2001 when no big bath (i.e., goodwill 
impairment) was available.  However, in 2002 when the big bath was available, it appears that the firms with poor 
earnings took advantage of it. 
 
It could be argued that companies writing down goodwill would be expected to have depressed earnings.  
The depressed earnings could be viewed as a signal that the company no longer enjoys the operational advantages 
that once gave rise to its goodwill.  That is, the lower-than-usual earnings could be a trigger causing management to 
question the validity of the company’s recorded goodwill.  However, it is unlikely that depressed earnings in one 
period alone would cause management to doubt the value of its goodwill.  It seems that this doubt would arise only 
after multiple periods of low earnings.  The results above show that the companies taking the goodwill write downs 
in 2002 experienced earnings problems in 2002 but not in the prior year.  This suggests that the impairment losses 
were likely recorded because managers for the these companies viewed 2002 as an opportune time to take big baths 
and further reduce their already depressed earnings. 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
The big bath theory holds that companies with unusually low earnings in the current year will take large 
write downs to lower earnings even further.  There seems to be little additional penalty for missing the earnings 
mark by a lot rather than by a little.  The large write downs taken in the current year should improve future earnings 
performance as the burden has already been removed.  Although the accounting literature is replete with studies on 
earnings management in general, there exists a paucity of empirical research specifically testing the big bath theory.  
However, Walsh et al. (1991) and Chenheiter and Melumad (2002) do provide evidence of its existence.  The 
current study expands the empirical literature on big bath theory and presents additional proof that this method of 
earnings management is alive and well. 
 
In 2002, SFAS No. 142 ended the decades long practice of amortizing goodwill.  Instead, firms must now 
test goodwill annually for impairment and write down this intangible asset if necessary.  Applying the impairment 
test requires the use of significant discretion on the part of management and presents a unique opportunity to 
manage earnings through big bath charges.  SFAS No. 142 provided additional incentive to take big baths in 2002, 
the year of adoption, by stating that initial write downs taken that year would be reported as a change in accounting 
principle and, thus, would not affect operating results.  Write downs in subsequent years must be reported as 
operating expenses. 
 
For the Fortune 100 companies reporting goodwill, this study showed that firms taking goodwill impair-
ment charges in 2002 possessed significantly lower earnings in 2002 than did their counterparts not recording the 
write downs.  In 2001 before the opportunity to take these discretionary impairment losses existed, the two groups of 
companies reported similar earnings levels.  In addition to having lower earnings overall in 2002, the group of firms 
taking the write downs also experienced a significantly higher rate of negative earnings in 2002 than did the non-
impairment group.  In 2001 when no impairments existed, however, both groups demonstrated similar rates of firms 
with negative earnings.  These results provide compelling evidence that firms practiced big bath earnings manage-
ment in the year SFAS No. 142 was adopted. 
 
6.  Suggestions For Future Research 
 
The current study tested for and found evidence of big bath earnings management in the initial year of 
adopting SFAS No. 142 for the Fortune 100 companies.  Elliott and Shaw (1988) suggest that larger firms may be 
more likely to take big baths than smaller firms.  Future research could test this notion in relation to SFAS No. 142 
by replicating the present study with a random sample of publicly traded companies of varying sizes.  The sample 
could be segregated into two groups based on company size to determine whether size impacts the likelihood that 
big baths will be taken in relation to goodwill impairment. 
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The current project examined big baths in 2002 partly because it was the year of adoption for SFAS No. 
142 and also because it was the most recent year for which data were available.  As time passes, however, later years 
can be examined to determine if companies with depressed earnings take big baths even though some of the incen-
tive for doing so in relation to goodwill impairment no longer applies.  More specifically, impairment losses sub-
sequent to 2002 must flow through operating income and, thus, may carry a steeper penalty for firms than existed in 
the initial year of adopting SFAS No. 142.  This may discourage big baths via goodwill impairment after 2002.  	 
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